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JONES V. MURRAY: ALLOWING THE
GOVERNMENT To GET BLOOD FROM
A STONE
In recent years, the courts have gradually drained the lifeblood
from the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,'
leaving the carcass of individual liberty to bake under the sun of
the government's transgressions.2 In effecting this circumspection
of individual liberty, the courts employ an analytical framework
establishing exceptions to the warrant, probable cause and
particularization requirements of the Fourth Amendment.3 The
decision of the United States District Court for the Western District
of Virginia in Jones v. Murray,4 and the recent opinion of the
Fourth Circuit substantially affirming it, constitute the most recent
and most troubling effort yet to relax Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. As a result of the Jones decisions, states are granted a license
to search individuals without a warrant, without reasonable
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing and without any articulation of
particularized suspicion. This grant appears to be of little incremen-
tal significance in light of the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association5 and
1. The Fourth Amendment guarantees that-
[t]he right of the people to be secure m their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
thmgs to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Commentators have chromcled extensively the alarming willingness of courts to
erode Fourth Amendment protection over the past several years. See, e.g., Michael J.
Flannery, Note, Abridged Too Far: Anticipatory Search Warrants and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 781, 784-807 (1991) (describing the ongm of the Fourth
Amendment and development by the Supreme Court of principles related to it).
3. See nfra notes 39-67 and accompanying text.
4. 763 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Va. 1991), affrd in part and rev'd in part, No. 91-6057,
1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6322 (4th Cir. Apr. 7, 1992).
5. 489 U.S. 602 (1989). For a discussion of the Skinner Court's holding and ratio-
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National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab6 sanctioning
warrantless and suspicionless searches. However, the context in
which the Jones search was conducted vanes considerably from the
contexts reviewed by the Court in these cases. In Sanner and Von
Raab, the searches at issue were conducted m employment settings
to find evidence of current or past employment rule violations. In
contrast, the Jones search was conducted to find evidence of a
crime that might be committed in the future. If Slanner and Von
Raab were the pride of lions bringing the Fourth Amendment to its
knees through their evisceration of antecedent governmental justifi-
cation for searches for evidence of current or past crimes, Jones is
the vulture picking at the carrion of remaining safeguards by ex-
tending this carnage to searches for evidence of future disobedi-
ence. The numerous flaws of the Jones decisions and implications
of the Jones search provide the basis for this comment.
In 1990, the General Assembly for the Commonwealth of
Virgina enacted Section 19.2-310.2 of the Virginia Code (the
"Code") which provides:
[e]very person convicted of a felony on or after July 1,
1990, and every person convicted of a [felony sex offense]
who was incarcerated on July 1, 1989, shall have a sample
of his blood taken for DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) analy-
sis to determine identification characteristics specific to the
person. The analysis shall be performed by the Bureau of
Forensic Science within the Division of Consolidated Labo-
ratory Services, Department of General Services.'
The "identification characteristics" garnered from these analy-
ses are to be stored and maintained by the Bureau of Forensic
Science (the "Bureau") in a DNA data bank.' The Code further
provides that the identification characteristics contained in the data
bank may be released to "federal, state and local law-enforcement
officers upon request made in furtherance of an official investiga-
nale, see znfra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
6. 489 U.S. 656 (1989). For a discussion of the Von Raab Court's holding and ratio-
nale, see infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2 (Miclue 1990). The Jones court noted that "[a]t least
eleven states have enacted DNA statutes similar to Virgnua's statute based on recidivism
rates of convicted felons.- Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 846 n.8.
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.2. See also t& § 19.2-310.4 (prescribing methods for
storing and maintaining analyses).
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tion of a criminal offense."9 As the district court in Jones deter-
mined, "the data bank is being developed to aid law enforcement
officials in investigating future violent crimes"10 and "may be ac-
cessed for this purpose only "11
On October 9, 1990, Lawrence Jones and other Virgima pns-
oners filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Virgiia challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the Virguna DNA data bank statute.
12
The plaintiffs based the constitutional challenge on the argument,
inter alia, that the taking of blood and subsequent analysis thereof
violates the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 3
On October 12, 1990, the court demed the plaintiffs' motion
for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. 4 The
court granted the state's motion for summary judgment on March
4, 1991. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
that the DNA testing does not constitute an unreasonable search
and seizure.'
5
The district court reasoned that the DNA search fell within the
confines of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and, more particular-
ly, the special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment.16 Ap-
plying a balancing test, the court concluded that the state's interest
9. Id § 19.2-310.5.
10. Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 844 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.5).
11. Id (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.6).
12. Id. at 843. Jones and his co-plaintiffs also moved for class certification at this
time. Id The motion was denied on October 12, 1990. Id. In response to a consent mo-
tion for class certification filed by all parties on October 18, 1990, the court, on October
26, 1990, "certified a class of all felons who have been or will be convicted of a felony
under the laws of the Commonwealth of Virginia and who will be subject to blood tests
for DNA analysis pursuant to Va.Code Ann. § 19.2-310.2" Id
13. Id at 844. In addition, the plaintiffs challenged the validity of the Virginia statute
on the grounds that the statute violates their right to privacy and that blood testing of
those plaintiffs convicted prior to the statute's effective date violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause of the Constitution and interferes with ther "vested liberty interest in mandatory
parole because the blood test constitutes a condition of parole." Id Discussion of these
alternate grounds for decision is beyond the scope of this comment.
14. Id at 843.
15. Jones v. Murray, No. 91-6057, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6322 (4th Cir. Apr. 7,
1992), afg in part and rev'g in part 763 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Va. 1991). The Fourth
Circuit reversed on the narrow ground that the DNA statute violated the Constitution's
prohibition against ex post facto laws by requiring that releases to be made pursuant to
the state's mandatory parol law be delayed long enough for prison officials to collect
blood samples. Id at *25.
16. Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 844-46.
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in deterring and detecting recidivist acts significantly outweighed
the plaintiffs' privacy interests.17 Thus, according to the Jones
court, withdrawal of blood and subsequent DNA analysis conducted
with the intention of deterring and detecting potential future crime
is a reasonable search and does not abridge the Fourth
Amendment.'
The Circuit panel agreed that the state's interest in collecting
the DNA samples outweighed prisoners' privacy interests, but it
found reliance on the special needs exception unnecessary 19 It
likened the DNA testing to fingerprinting and therefore concluded
that no individualized suspicion was required for the search.2"
This comment argues that, contrary to the opinion of the
courts, the Jones search should be deemed per se unconstitutional.
The courts' reasoning was techmcally flawed in several respects.21
In addition, the Jones search transgresses the lustorical premises of
the Fourth Amendment.22 Furthermore, prior to Jones, Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence was confined to searches in which an
identifiable suspicion of current or past disobedience existed, a
suspicion which would be presently confirmed or denied by the
results of the search. The search conducted in Jones, however, was
a prospective search, a search for evidence of crimes about which
the state could have no knowledge because the crimes have yet to
occur and, in fact, may never happen. Thus, it is not certain that
the state would ever use the fruits of the Jones search to confirm
or deny the guilt of an individual. This comment argues that the
uncertainty of future events renders the Jones search unconstitution-
ally arbitrary 2 Finally, the policy implications of allowing states
to justify any search on the basis of a need to detect or deter fu-
ture crimes buttress the conclusion that the search in Jones violates
the Fourth Amendment.24
I. BACKGROUND
The demise of Fourth Amendment protection at the hands of
17. Id at 846-48.
18. Id at 848.
19. Jones, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS at *13 n.2.
20. Id
21. See infra text accompanying notes 104-21.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 122-23.
23. See infra text accompanymg notes 124-29.
24. See infra text accompanying note 130.
[V/ol. 42:635
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the Court has become legendary, its opinions rendering "[c]urrent
search and seizure doctrine mconsistent and mcoherent."'
During the past two decades, the Court has forced the amorphous
text of the Fourth Amendment through doctrinal sieves of ever-
decreasing diameters. The result is a morass of ad hoc exceptions
carved from the Fourth Amendment, reducing it to a quivering
mass of ineffective safeguards against the state's intrusion on the
rights of its citizens.
The well-documented history of the Fourth Amendment evi-
dences an intent to fetter the state's unbridled discretion during the
1700's. English customs officers, through empowerments called
writs of assistance, entered and searched buildings owned by Amer-
ican colonists whenever the officers suspected the presence of
smuggled goods.26 These writs of assistance were general search
warrants which authorized a civil officer and hIs deputies to
"search any house, shop, [or] warehouse, break open doors, chests,
packages, m case of resistance; and remove any prohibited or un-
customed 'goods or merchandise."27 The writs granted officials
unbridled discretion, allowing them "continuous license" to search
wherever and whenever they suspected the presence of smuggled
goods.2"
Americans of the revolutionary era despised writs of assis-
tance. In 1761, James Otis, Jr., representing sixty-three Boston
merchants, spoke out against them in a court hearing. Otis called
the writs "the worst instance of arbitrary power, the most destruc-
tive of English liberty, that ever was found in an English law
book.'29 John Adams, a spectator at the hearing, later recalled:
"[Otis] was a flame of fire! . Every man of a crowded audience
appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to take arms against
writs of assistance . Then and there the Child Independence
was born. In fifteen years, namely in 1776, he grew up to man-
hood, and declared himself free.""
25. Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth
Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 474 (1991).
26. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONsTUTION 54 (1970).
27. Id at 53.
28. Id. at 54.
29. Id. at 59.
30. 1 WAYNE P. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 1.1, at 4 (1978) (quoting 10 CHARLES ADAMS, THE LIFE AND WoRKS oF
JOHN ADAMS 247-48 (1856)).
1992]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Article 10 of the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 was the
"first American precedent of a constitutional character for the
Fourth Amendment." 31 Virginia's Patrick Henry, leader of the
drive to formulate a bill of rights for the United States Constitu-
tion, drew upon the Virginia Constitution as a model for the ex-
press protection of individual liberty at the expense of a strong
32central government. In particular, Henry decried the potential
unbridled authority of federal sheriffs acting under authority of
general warrants and at a distance from their superiors.33 Both
houses of the federal Congress enacted the Fourth Amendment as it
now exists.34
Initially, the express mandates of the Fourth Amendment were
strictly construed. As recently as 1967, the Court reaffirmed the
need for a warrant prior to a constitutional search or seizure, an-
nouncing in Katz v. United States that "searches conducted outside
the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate,
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment - subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions."3  The Court extended its literal interpretation of Fourth
Amendment requirements by insisting that officers demonstrate
probable cause36 and particularized suspicion37 prior to custodial
31. LASSON, supra note 26, at 79. Article 10 provided:
[t]hat general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be commanded to
search suspected places without evidence of a fact committed, or to seize any
person or persons not named, or whose offence is not particularly described
and supported by evidence, are grievous and oppressive, and ought not to be
granted.
2 BENJAMIN P. POORE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CoNSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS
AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 1909 (2d ed. 1972).
32. Icd at 92-93.
33. Id at 92.
34. Id at 101-02.
35. 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (citations omitted). The Court noted that law enforce-
ment officers had sufficient probable cause to obtain a warrant allowing use of electromc
surveillance equipment to record the defendant's conversation, but it reversed the convic-
tion because the officers had failed to secure such a warrant. Id at 359.
36. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983) (totality of the ctrcum-
stances approach); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (necessity of probable cause for
a warrantless search); Brnegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) (concluding
that standard for a warrant differs from standard for warrantless search, but both standards
require reasonable belief in guilt); see also 1 LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 3.1, at 437
("Central to the protection of [the right to be left alone] is the concept of 'probable
cause, for under the Fourth Amendment the police may not make and arrest or search
unless they have probable cause to do so."); Alexander E. Eisemann, Note, Addressing the
Pretext Problem: The Role of Subjective Police Motivation in Establishing Fourth Amend-
[Vol. 42:635
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arrests or searches The combination of these three requirements,
the existence of a warrant prior to a search, probable cause and
particularized suspicion, provided a framework faithful to the pre-
cepts of the Fourth Amendment by prohibiting police from en-
croachng on the privacy right of individuals absent a "reasonable
ground for belief in guilt."38
In the years since Katz, the Court has seized upon the excep-
tions language of the opinuon's oft-cited rule to carve out a bur-
geonmg variety of "necessity-mandated" exceptions to the express
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.39 These exceptions in-
clude stop and frisk searches, searches incident to arrest,
4 I
searches of vehcles,42  consent searches,43 exigent circumstance
searches," inventory searches45 and searches in which "special
ment Violations, 63 B.U. L. Rev. 223, 227 (1983) (stating that the "probable cause re-
quirement establishes a threshold level of information that police must gather before they
can exercise search or seizure powers").
37. Particularization has traditionally been a pertinent factor m Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-60 (1979) (finding random
warrantless stops too broad a search for discovering unlicensed drivers and unregistered
cars, especially m light of adequate alternatives); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 560 (1976) (noting that police must generally possess some quantum of mdivid-
ualized suspicion prior to invading an individual's privacy).
38. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925) (quoting McCarthy v. De
Armit, 99 Pa. 63, 69 (1881)). This literal construction of the Fourth Amendment's de-
mands performs an important practical function: providing clear guidance to law enforce-
ment personnel as to the requirements for a constitutional search or seizure. Cf. New
York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458-60 (1981) (determining that Fourth Amendment protec-
tion could best be realized if the - police have a single familiar standard to follow when
conducting a vehicle search incident to arrest of the occupants).
39. See California v. Acevedo, Ill S.CL 1982, 1992 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring)
('Even before today's decision, the 'warrant requirement' had become so riddled with
exceptions that it was basically unrecognizable."). Justice Scalia cited Craig M. Bradley,
Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473-74 (1985), as "cata-
log[ing] nearly 20 such exceptions."
40. See, e.g., Terry v. Oio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968) (holding that a person could be
detained for a brief period of time without a warrant and without probable cause if a
police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person is armed and presently dangerous
and the search "[is] reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justiffy] the
interference in the first place").
41. See, e.g., Chinmel v. Califonua, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (allowing the search of a
person arrested and the area within his immediate control, but refusing to permit warrant-
less searches of the entire home where a person is arrested).
42. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-51 (1970) (holding that an auto-
mobile, because of its mobility, may be searched without a warrant if there is probable
cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found in it).
43. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1973) (holding that
the voluntariness of consent is to be determined from all the circumstances and that
knowledge of the right to refuse is one of many factors to be considered).
44. See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (holding that warrantless
1992]
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needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the
warrant and probable cause requirements impracticable."46 In each
of these cases, the Court focused its analysis on the reasonableness
language of the Fourth Amendment so that it could eliminate the
warrant and probable cause requirements while retaining the
particularization requirement.47 The Court replaced the rejected
requirements with a balancing test which weighs the government's
interest in conducting a search against the legitimate expectation of
privacy of the individual being searched.48 With each exception,
the Court succeeded in incrementally reducing Fourth Amendment
protection by according broad deference to the government's inter-
est.49 This diminution of Fourth Amendment protection culminated
in the warrantless, suspicionless and nonparticulanzed searches
sanctioned by the Court in Slanner v. Railway Labor Executives'
Association"° and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von
Raab.51
search and seizure is reasonable if destruction of evidence is imminent).
45. See, e.g., Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983) (upholding police search
of an arrestee's property for inventory purposes prior to incarceration).
46. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). The
Court has recognized maintenance of an efficient and proper government workplace,
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723-24 (1987), stifling importation of illegal contra-
band, United States v. Montoya de Hemandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985), and mainte-
nance of orderly classrooms, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985), as special
needs justifying warrantless searches.
47. T.LO., 469 U.S. at 337; Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 643; Cupp, 412 U.S. at 295-96;
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 242-43; Chambers, 399 U.S. at 52; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764-65;
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
48. See, e.g., T.LO., 469 U.S. at 337. Applying the balancing test in T.LO., the Court
determined that:
a search of a student by a school official will be 'justified at its
inception' when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting the search will turn
up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the
rules of the school [and is] permissible mn its scope when the measures
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not exces-
sively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and nature of the
infraction.
Id at 342-43 (quoting Terry v. Oluo, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
49. See Bookspan, supra note 25, at 474 n.4 (discerning a clear trend of judicial def-
erence to the government after reviewing cases before the Court in 1959, 1969, 1979 and
1989). See also, Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judictal Protection of
Indivdual Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41
HASTINGS L.J. 805, 875-903 (1990) (documenting the Court's strong deference to the
government's interests which served to circumscribe the rights of individuals throughout
the 1988-89 Term).
50. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
51. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
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The Court in Skinner considered the constitutionality of Feder-
al Railroad Admimstration regulations mandating toxicological
testing of the blood, urine and breath of employees involved in
"major tram accidents" or rule violations and authorizing
toxicological testing of employees in other circumstances.52 The
Court found that "special needs" made it Impractical for the gov-
ernment to obtain a warrant53 or to articulate either probable
cause' or reasonable suspicion,55 and it reasoned that the cir-
cumstances therefore required a test less strict than that typically
employed in the criminal context.' To determine whether or not
the searches were reasonable, the Court balanced the privacy inter-
ests of the employees against the government's interest in test-
ing.57 Focusing on the potential for "great human loss" and the
inability to adequately detect drug use by other means, the Court
found the government's interest in testing railway employees for
drug use compelling. On the other side of the balance, the Court
found that annual physical examination requirements reduced the
employees' privacy expectations.59  Concluding that the
government's interest outweighed the employees' expectation of
privacy, it upheld drug testing of railroad employees involved in
serious accidents or rule violations."
Von Raab involved a constitutional challenge to Customs
Service regulations which required employees placed, i.e., hired,
transferred or promoted, into certain positions to be tested for drug
use as a condition of such placement.61 The Customs Service re-
quired drug testing, for positions involving "front-line" drug inter-
diction or requiring employees to carry firearms or handle classi-
fied materials.62 Addressing each type of position separately, the
Court balanced the government's interest in testing against the
employees' expectations of privacy 63 It upheld testing of front
line interdiction forces, finding that the government has a "compel-
52. 489 U.S. at 606, 609.
53. Id at 624.
54. Id
55. Id
56. Id at 620.
57. Id at 633.
58. Id at 628-30.
59. Id at 628.
60. Id at 633.
61. National Treasury Employees Umon v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 660 (1989).
62. Id at 660-61.
63. Id at 664-65.
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ling interest in ensuring that [those] personnel are physically fit,
and have umimpeachable integrity and judgment." 64 The Court also
found compelling the government's interest in ensuring the safety
of its employees and the public through institution of measures to
prevent drug users from carrying firearms. 65 "Because successful
performance of [the] duties [of Customs employees who are direct-
ly involved in drug interdiction or required to carry firearms in the
line of duty] depends umquely on their judgment and dexterity,"
these employees have a reduced expectation of privacy regarding
information which bears directly on their fitness.'
Through this spectrum of cases, the Court has established a
balancing analysis grounded on a broader concept of reason-
ableness, gradually eliminating the warrant, probable cause and
particularization requirements of the Fourth Amendment when the
government is not engaging in law enforcement conduct.67
II. JONES V MURRAY
The district court's opimon in Jones applied the Skanner/Von
Raab principles to the facts of the case after the court concluded
that the search was an exception to the law enforcement man-
date.6" The Jones court began its analysis by concluding summan-
ly that the extraction of blood and subsequent analysis as delin-
eated under the Code constituted a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes.69 The court acknowledged that in most circumstances,
the reasonableness of a search is "measured by a warrant demon-
strating probable cause."7" However, the court also concluded that
64. Id at 670.
65. Id at 670-71.
66. Id at 672. The Court remanded the case as it pertained to persons handling classi-
fled materials because the record was "inadequate" for determining the constitutionality of
testing those employees. 1d at 665.
67. When a search is conducted for law enforcement purposes, or in other words,
within a criminal context, the Court will read the Fourth Amendment literally, deferring to
its express warrant, probable cause and particularization mandates. See National Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989) (implying that use of the
results from the Customs Service's drug testing program for crimunal prosecutions of em-
ployees would have implicated the ordinary warrant and probable cause requirements).
68. Jones v. Murray, 763 F Supp. 842, 845 (W.D. Va. 1991), affd in part and rev'd
in part, No. 91-6057, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6322 (4th Cir. apr. 7, 1992).
69. Id at 844 (citing Schmerber v. Califorma, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)). The state conced-
ed that taking and analyzing blood was a search, but it argued that the search was rea-
sonable. Id
70. Id
644 [Vol. 42:635
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"establishment (f a data bank can be classified as a special need,
even if the data bank will be used in solving future crimes."71
Accordingly, the court followed the special needs approach, apply-
mg the standard Fourth Amendment interest-balancing formula to
ascertain the reasonableness of the search.72
The court found two factors identified in Von Raab and Skan-
ner particularly supportive of the special needs classification of the
Jones search: (1) the impracticality of demonstrating individualized
suspicion,73 and (2) the existence of well-defined rules governing
the intrusion.7 4 In Von Raab, the Supreme Court determined that
articulation of individualized suspicion was infeasible because sub-
stance abuse is a latent or hidden condition.75 Similarly, the Jones
court reasoned that it would be impossible for the state to obtain a
warrant supported by probable cause in the plaintiffs' situation be-
cause "[t]he data bank will help solve future crimes; no crime has
yet been committed, thus no suspicion exists."7 6 In addition, the
Jones court concluded cryptically that a warrant is not required to
take and analyze blood because the search was "authorized by state
law" and the discretion of officials conducting the search was,
therefore, adequately circumscribed.'
Notwithstanding sinilarities to Skinner and Von Raab appar-
ently confirmmng that the special needs standard should apply, the
Jones court still had to overcome a significant hurdle before finally
concluding it was the correct standard. The plaintiffs in Jones
argued that the special needs test was limited to searches outside
the "normal needs of law enforcement." '78 The Jones plaintiffs
asserted that extraction of blood samples with the intent of com-
piling identification characteristics from the DNA contained therein
is a law enforcement function; the data collected would be used to
link individuals to future crimes. Thus, the plaintiffs argued that
the DNA data bank statute could not be sustained under the special
71. Id at 845.
72. Id at 846-48.
73. Id at 845 & n.6 (citing both National Treasury Employees Umon v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989) and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n., 489 U.S. 602,
624 (1989)).
74. Id (citing Skinner, 489 U.S. at 622).
75. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668.
76. Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 845 (emphasis added).
77. Id at 845-46.
78. Id at 845.
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needs analysis.79
The special needs test had been limited previously to those
circumstances outside the "normal needs of law enforcement."80
Nonetheless, the court disagreed with plaintiffs' premise that the
special needs exception was so limited. The court disposed of the
argument by citing the Supreme Court's opinion in Griffin v. Wis-
consin.81 In Griffin, the Court invoked the special needs exception
to uphold a probation officer's search of a probationer's house on
less than probable cause that evidence of a crime would be found
there.82 The Jones court found support for its conclusion even in
Justice Blackmun's Griffin dissent: "while denying that probationers
should be subject to warrantless searches, [the dissent] recogmzed
that 'the presence of special law enforcement needs justifies resort
to the balancing test.'"8 3
Having established the propriety of applying a balancing test,
the court proceeded to examine the respective interests of the state
and the prisoner-plaintiffs, beginning with the state. 4 The court
rebuffed plaintiffs' assertion that Virgima does not have a signifi-
cant interest in conducting the DNA search. 5 The court found the
state's interest in deterring and detecting recidivist acts by convict-
ed felons to be significant.86 In addition, as dictated by the Su-
preme Court in Delaware v. Prouse,7 the court inquired as to
whether the search "is a sufficiently productive mechamsm to justi-
fy its intrusion upon the fourth amendment interests."88 The Jones
court concluded that the DNA analysis sought by the state clearly
79. Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 844-45.
80. See, e.g., Sknmer v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
The Skinner Court noted that in most criminal cases, the Court "strikes the balance in
favor" of the express procedures provided for by the warrant clause of the Fourth Amend-
ment. IL The Court went further to point out that exceptions to the warrant clause
mandates have been recognized when "special needs" outside normal law enforcement cre-
ate a situation where the probable cause and warrant requirements are impracticable. Id
In these cases, the Court has balanced the government and private interests to determine
whether the warrant and probable cause requirements could be applied practically. L
See also cases cited supra note 47.
81. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
82. l at 878-79.
83. Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 845 (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 881 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting)).
84. L at 846.
85. I
86. Id
87. 440 U.S. 648 (1978).
88. Ia at 658-59, quoted in Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 846.
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met the Prouse requirement, summarily asserting that even "[i]f the
data bank aids law enforcement in solving less than twenty-five
percent of violent crimes, the deterrent effect of such a tool would
still appear to be significant.""9 The court refused to judge the
efficiency of the state's testing procedure as determinative of the
Prouse requirement; instead, it applied rational-basis type scrutiny
and found the DNA testing procedure sufficient to justify the intru-
sion on Fourth Amendment rights because the procedure bears a
"close and substantial" relationship to the state's goal of detecting
and deterring recidivism.'
For the other side of the balance, the court considered the
extent to which DNA testing intrudes on the plaintiffs' privacy
interest.9 Citing the Supreme Court's observations in Schmerber
v. Califorma92 that "blood tests are commonplace and experience
has shown that 'for most people the procedure involves virtually
no risk, trauma, or pam, ' ' 93 as well as the rule of that case that
"the Constitution does not forbid the States [sic] minor intrusions
into an individual's body, " the Jones court concluded that any
intrusion experienced by the those in plaintiffs' position is de mnm-
mis.
94
Analogizing DNA testing to fingerprinting, the court also
reasoned that the felons subject to DNA analysis do not have a le-
gitimate expectation of privacy in the identification characteristics
to be compiled and stored.9 Despite plaintiffs' assertion that
DNA analysis may reveal much more about the individual than a
fingerprint, the court found no greater intrusion from the DNA test
because the only information available to the government from the
DNA samples are identification characteristics.' Further, the court
noted that the Virginia Code restricts the availability of information
from the DNA data bank to law enforcement personnel only and
provides that the stored information will be distributed only if a
DNA sample obtained as evidence of a subsequent crime matches
89. Id at 847 & n.12.
90. Id at 847.
91. Id at 847-48.
92. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
93. Jones, 763 F.Supp. at 847 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771).
94. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771, quoted in Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 847.
95. Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 847.
96. Id According to the court, "plaintiffs portray[ed] DNA analysis as the key to one's
physical and mental predisposition " Id
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the sample in the data bank.' Finally, the court acknowledged
that its characterization of the intrusion on plaintiffs' privacy inter-
est as minimal is aided by the fact that convicted felons "relinquish
some expectation of privacy "9
In light of this analysis, the court held that the DNA search
mandated by the Virginia Code is reasonable and, thus, does not
violate the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights.
The Fourth Circuit dispensed with the special needs analysis
altogether." While the district court was concerned that individu-
alized suspicion in these cases be portrayed as impracticable to
satisfy the special needs criteria, the Circuit court found individual-
ized suspicion irrelevant:
We have not been made aware of any case, however, es-
tablishing a per se Fourth Amendment requirement of prob-
able cause, or even a lesser degree of individualized suspi-
cion, when government officials conduct a limited search
for the purpose of ascertaimng and recording the identity of
a person who is lawfully confined to prison."°
The court relied upon the Supreme Court's decisions in Bell v.
Wolfish 0 1 and Hudson v. Palmert"2 to conclude that convicted
felons "lose a right of privacy from routine searches. i103
97. Id. at 848 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-310.5).
98. Id (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 (1979)).
99. Jones v. Murray, No. 91-6057, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6322 (4th Cir. Apr. 7,
1992), aff'g in part and revg in part 763 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Va. 1991).
100. Id at *11.
101. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
102. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
103. Jones, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS at *12. Judge Murnaghan, dissenting in part, criti-
cized the majority's construction of Bell and Hudson. lit at *31-33. "Although Bell allows
for certain invasive search procedures, Bell does not suggest that probable cause detainees
have abrogated the entire panopoly of privacy protections." Id at * 31. Judge
Mumaghan refused to equate the invasive procedure mandated by Virginia with the
searches of detainees and prison cells authonzed by Bell and Hudson for maintaining
security in prison facilities. "[Tihe search involved in the present case, blood testing,
violates a privacy interest that even a prisoner, living in close quarters under constant
security surveillance, reasonably can expect to enjoy." Id at *32. Nevertheless, Judge
Mumaghan inexplicably concluded that the "testing procedures should be reviewed under
the standard applied to a search of any individual when such a search is not based on
individualized suspicion: the privacy interest of the prisoner in remaining free of bodily
invasion should be balanced against the state interest in carrying out the search." Id at
*30 (emphasis added). Tus analysts is essentially the same as that employed by the ma-
jority to test the reasonableness of the search. Unlike the majority, however, Judge
Murnaghan found the testing program justified for those conviced of violent felonies, but
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III. ANALYSIS
The conclusions of the courts that the search performed on
Jones and Ins fellow prisoners did not violate their Fourth Amend-
ment rights are flawed in several respects. For example, the district
court evades the individualized suspicion requirement by the circu-
lar reasoning that proof of individualized suspicion should not be
required of the state because no suspicion can exist for the search-
es authorized. The court's implicit conclusion that legislators may
circumvent constitutional rights on the basis of probabilistic evi-
dence is problematic at best. In assessing the productivity of DNA
testing as a mechamsm to decrease the incidence of recidivism, the
court failed to account for negative ramifications such as the possi-
bility of encouraging individuals whose identification characteristics
are recorded in the bank to murder rape victims and dispose of
their bodies to make detection more difficult. Both the district and
circuit courts erred in equating DNA collection with fingerprinting.
They ignored the fact that the latter search is strictly circumscribed
to the period incident to arrest. Finally, the search undertaken in
Jones was for law enforcement purposes and thus should have been
subject to the express warrant, probable cause and particularization
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
In addition to these analytical flaws, the Jones search also
unacceptably transgresses individual liberties in direct contradiction
to the historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment.
The Jones search is problematic conceptually as well. Until
this case, courts have required that searches undertaken be in re-
sponse to an identifiable suspicion of current or past disobedience
which would be presently confirmed or demed by the fruits of the
search. In contrast, the Jones search was conducted to find evi-
dence which would possibly be used in the future to confirm or
deny future disobedience. Consequently, the Jones search is signifi-
cantly more arbitrary than any search thus far addressed by the
courts.
Finally, policy considerations counsel against sustaining the
Jones search as constitutional. The justification for the search prof-
fered by the government and accepted by the Jones court provides
the state with a license to conduct lughly intrusive and arbitrary
searches.
unreasonable with respect to non-violent felons. Id at *36-37.
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The Jones search should be struck down as mconsistent with
the mandates of the Fourth Amendment.
A. Reasoning Defects
The district court reasoned that because no individualized
suspicion could exist in the plaintiffs' situation, none should be re-
quired in the Fourth Amendment calculus it employed."w Prior to
tlus case, the Supreme Court had upheld searches without mdividu-
alized suspicion on the grounds that requiring officials to articulate
an individualized suspicion was impractical because the dangerous
condition was hidden' °5 or because the contact between the gov-
ernment and the individual was too brief for a focused suspicion to
develop." 6 Even under these circumstances, however, the pres-
ence of a condition subject to regulation was suspected but non-
detectable. In Jones, no suspicion can exist because no regulated
condition is present; the plaintiffs have not committed a crime for
which the DNA samples would serve as evidence nor is it certain
that they ever will commit such a crime. It is absurd and immense-
ly self-serving to hold that because the court cannot possibly satis-
fy one requirement for a constitutional search, it will do away with
the requirement instead of invalidating the intrusion.
The district court also relied too heavily on the Virginia
statute's restrictions on DNA analysts and law enforcement officers
for its conclusion that the law adequately circumscribed discre-
tion." Although the statute is written to minimize the discretion
of those conducting the searches and compiling the DNA files, the
decision of Virginia legislators to search certain felons incarcerated
in Virginia prisons was itself an exercise of discretion. Apparently,
the legislature acted based on a pair of studies proffered by the
state defense counsel showing that convicted felons are likely to
commit crimes after their release from prison.' Without address-
104. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Camara v. Mumcipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967) (holding that an
area-inspection of several buildings absent suspicion associated with any particular building
is reasonable because "many conditions are not observable from outside the
building .).
106. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 557 (1976) (concluding that indi-
vidualized suspicion "would be impractical" in searches of automobiles for illegal aliens
'because the flow of traffic tends to be too heavy to allow the particularized study of a
given car ").
107. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
108. Jones v. Murray, 763 F Supp. 842, 846 n.9 (W.D. Va. 1991), aff'd in part and
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ing the validity of recidivism rates,' °9 the court accepted such
probabilistic data as adequate cause for the legislature's action. The
court's opinion begs the question of the propriety of a legislative
body relying on inherently uncertain probabilistic evidence as a
basis for circumventing individuals' constitutionally protected
rights. Reliance on statistical evidence is particularly troublesome
because no rules exist to guide either courts or legislatures in de-
termining threshold probabilities above which individual rights may
be cast aside for the sake of some greater governmental pur-
pose.
110
The district court also concluded that the DNA data bank
would increase the probability of detecting repeat offenders, creat-
ing a deterrent effect sufficiently significant to justify abdication of
the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights.' The Fourth Circuit
concurred." 2 The courts failed to consider other potential effects
which could render the data bank a detriment to deterrence. For
example, an increased likelihood of detection could lead felons
whose identification characteristics are on file to murder their rape
victims and dispose of the bodies to destroy physical evidence that
might be matched to data bank samples. Thus, the data bank could
actually have the effect of decreasing detection rates.
In addition, the courts analogized DNA samples to fingerprints
because both can be used for identification purposes. Finding no
legitimate expectation of privacy in one's identification characteris-
tics, they concluded that plaintiffs have no legitimate expectation of
rev'd in part, No. 91-6057, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 6322 (4th Cir. Apr. 7, 1992).
109. The validity of recidivism rates is a subject of considerable dispute. See, e.g.,
Pm HOFFmAN, NATIONAL INsTIrUTE oF JusTIcE, PREDICTING CRIMINALTY (1988).
110. Compare City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505, 507-08 (1989)
(strildng down city's set-aside program because inconclusive statistical data failed to dem-
onstrate compelling government interest and because such inconclusive evidence could not
support a clan that the set-aside program was narrowly tailored to remedy past discrim-
nation); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 306-07, 294-95 (1987) (holding that a statis-
tical showing of risk that a statute was discrmunatorily applied in Georgia failed to make
a capital sentence disproportionate or arbitrary and capricious under the Eighth Amend-
ment and that statistical proof was not sufficient to prove purposeful discrimination under
the Fourteenth Amendment) with Gnggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-33 (1971)
(holding that a plaintiff can prove employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 through statistical data showing the defendant's hiring practices had a
racially disparate impact); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (concluding
that an Alabama redistricting plan was racially discriminatory based on statistical evidence
of the number of "Negro voters" who would probably be removed from the district if the
plan were implemented).
111. Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 846-47.
112. Jones, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS at *15-16.
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privacy with respect to the DNA testing. 13 The courts' analogy
to fingerprinting is flawed, however. Fingerprints may only be ob-
tained in furtherance of a criminal investigation, i.e., incident to a
lawful arrest.1 4  The identification characteristics gathered from
the Jones search, in contrast, will be used for law enforcement
purposes which arise, if at all, after the plaintiffs have been re-
leased from prison, i.e., post-arrest. Thus, any rationale advanced to
justify fingerprinting, including the need for the government to
know with absolute certainty the identity of the person arrested or
whether the person is wanted elsewhere and the need to ensure
identification in the event the person flees prosecution,' are
moot by the time the Jones search is conducted. As a consequence,
the analogy between fingerprints and DNA samples employed by
the courts is misleading." 6
Finally, the search undertaken in Jones was for law enforce-
ment purposes and, thus, should have been subject to the express
warrant, probable cause and particularity requirements of the Fourth
Amendment. The district court relied on the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Griffin v. Wisconsin that a balancing test rather than the
express mandates of the Fourth Amendment should be used to
113. Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 847; Jones, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS at *12-13.
114. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985) ("There is support m our
cases for the view that the Fourth Amendment would permit seizures for the purpose of
fingerprinting if there is a reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed a criminal
act, if there is a reasonable basis for believing that figerprinting will establish or negate
the suspect's connection with that crime. "); Napolitano v. United States, 340 F.2d
313, 314 (1st Cir. 1963) (stating that there was no merit in defendants' argument that the
taking of fingerprints mnediately prior to being admitted to bail and their subsequent use
violates the Fourth Amendment rights of the defendants because the "[t]aking of finger-
prints in such circumstances is umversally standard procedure "); see also 1 LAFAVE,
supra note 30, § 2.6(a), at 365 (stating that "it is well established that the taking of
fingerprints is permssible incident to a lawful arrest "). But see United States v.
Diomsio, 410 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1973) (analogizing m dicta fingerprinting to voice exemplars
which the Court held were not searches but mere observations of a characteristic, a
person's voice).
Professor LaFave questions this interpretation of the Diontsio holding since the sup-
port for thus proposition from Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), was "not mclud-
ed [in the Davis opinon] for the purpose of showing that fingerprinting is not a search
but rather for the purpose of showing that detention for such a limited intrusion might
.comply with the Fourth Amendment even though there is no probable cause in the tradi-
tional sense.' I LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 2.6(a).
115. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 30, § 5.3(c).
116. See Jones, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS at *34 n.2 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting in part)
("Mhe search involved here in the blood testing of potential future criminals is signifi-
cantly more alan to the gathering of evidence to support conviction at trial than to the
activity of identifying felons witun a prison facility.").
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analyze the reasonableness of the search.117 The Griffin Court
found that the search of a probationer by his probation officer was
undertaken to "ferret out crime" and decrease recidivism rates, and
therefore constituted a special need despite the search's law en-
forcement overtones.11 However, the court nusconstrued the Grif-
fin holding. The Griffin holding was limited to the probation con-
text; the search was justified because a probationer remains within
the confines of the penal system"9 and, thus, has a dimnushed
expectation of privacy 10
In Jones, the courts fail to recogmze that the fruits of the
DNA search, identification characteristics, will be used against the
plaintiffs in a law enforcement context after they are free of the
confines of the penal system. The extent of the intrusion on the
plaintiffs' privacy interests should be measured at that time, not
when blood samples are collected. After the plaintiffs are released
from prison, their expectation of privacy is restored along with
most of their other constitutional rights to the level enjoyed by all
others not incarcerated."' Thus, the identification characteristics
garnered from the Jones search will be used for law enforcement
purposes against individuals with a substantial portion of their
constitutional rights intact and the search should consequently be
subject to the express mandates of the Fourth Amendment.
117. Jones, 763 F. Supp. at 845 (relying on Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875-76
(1986)).
118. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874-75.
119. Id at 873 (charactenzing probation as "one of the points in a continuum of pun-
ishment").
120. Id at 880.
The Fourth Circuit stretches the holding of Griffin even further to support is conclu-
sion that no particularized suspicion is required. According to the circuit court, -[e]ven
probationers lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment with respect to their right to
privacy against searches of their homes pursuant to an established program to ensure
rehabilitation and security." Jones, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS at *12 (citing Griffin). How-
ever, because the probation officer had reasonable grounds to believe he would find con-
traband m Griffi's house, the Griffn opinion cannot be fairly construed as the Jones
court suggests. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 871.
121. A list of the few, but significant, rights of ex-convicts circumscribed frequently by
many state legislatures include the right to vote, to hold public office, to serve on juries,
to testify, to make contracts and to sue in court. See HARRY E. ALLEN & CLiFFORD E.
SiMONSEN, CORRECONS IN AMERICA 268 (1975).
It should be noted that this discussion assumes that individuals affected are, at some
point after their release from penal institutions, not subject to parole conditions which
may abdicate further their individual rights.
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B. Historical Insights
A DNA data bank of the character at issue in Jones is a
vehicle for the type of unfettered discretion in the hands of gov-
ernment officials the founding fathers sought to eliminate through
the Fourth Amendment. In the colomal times, writs of assistance
empowered English authorities to search the homes of colonists
without any prior justifiable suspicion that the home presently
contained illegal goods." In effect, the English officials were
able to conduct searches of homes for the sole purpose of ferreting
out evidence of crimes they did not know had been committed.
Similarly, the Jones search is not predicated on any suspicion
that the individual subject to it is presently committing a crime.
Authorities search the prisoners hoping to obtain evidence of a
crime they cannot know will ever be committed."2 This is pre-
cisely the type of search that the Fourth Amendment was designed
to eliminate.
C. Conceptual Flaws
It is axiomatic that the ultimate goal of our law enforcement
and judicial systems is to prove or disprove the guilt of a person
suspected of wrongdoing. The search is one of the fundamental
tools used by the government to accomplish this objective. Use of
this tool must, however, be balanced against the protection of
individual liberties from arbitrary acts of the government. The
Fourth Amendment is the primary vehicle by which those liberties
are protected.
A fundamental premise of any Fourth Amendment analysis
must be that suspicion of current or past disobedience is present,
for this is the ultimate check on arbitrary exercise of government
power. The degree to which any act can be characterized as arbi-
trary vanes directly with the uncertainty of purpose which prompts
the act. In other words, the more uncertain the existence of a ques-
tion, the more arbitrary the acts undertaken to satisfy the query
Conversely, acts done in pursuit of determlnng the answer to a
certain, objectively identifiable inquiry are purposeful and thus not
arbitrary 124 In the Fourth Amendment context, requiring current
122. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
124. This comment addresses the substantive rather than the procedural adequacy of the
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individualized suspicion thus ensures that the search is legitimate
and purposeful and that it is conducted to ascertain the answer to a
concrete, objectively identifiable and certain question. Articulation
of this suspicion ensures that the search is objectively justifiable,
i.e., there is an identifiable suspicion of wrongdoing which is to be
presently proved or disproved by the results of the search.
Courts have implicitly required present use in each of the
search contexts addressed prior to Jones. In the law enforcement
context, for instance, the government must demonstrate that it has
more than mere suspicion, i.e., probable cause, to believe that
evidence of a current or past crime will be found in a particular
location." s There must be a current belief that the fruits of the
search will be presently used to aid in proving or disproving the
innocence of a person currently suspected of having committed a
crime.
Likewise, in circumstances described as exceptions to the
express mandates of the Fourth Amendment, the government is re-
quired to articulate a reasonable suspicion of current or past wrong-
doing inferred from specific facts.26 Even in the special needs
contexts in which the Court requires no warrant or articulation of
probable cause, suspicion of current or past disobedience is neces-
sary before the search will pass constitutional muster. 27 Finally,
officials conducting Skinner and Von Raab searches need not dem-
onstrate the existence of particularized suspicion in the sense that
an individual must be identified as the target of the search,"' but
must at least articulate a suspicion that an undetected, yet present,
individual is currently functioning outside stated regulations. 29 In
all of these circumstances, the searches will yield information
acts. The process of conducting the acts is assumed to be legitimate.
125. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 333 F. Supp. 786, 787 (1971) (declaring that
"[a] search warrant will not issue upon an affidavit reciting only the anticipation of a
future offense"); see also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
126. See, for example, Terry v. Ouo, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) in which there is a re-
quirement that the search yield information which would confirm or deny the suspicion of
the officer that the individual being searched "is armed and presently dangerous" and thus
poses a threat to the officer or to others.
127. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985) (requiring, inter alla,
"reasonable grounds for suspecting the search will turn up evidence that the student has
violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school" (emphasis added)).
128. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
129. In Skinner, for instance, the search was conducted to detect the presence of drugs
in the urine of railway employees. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. Similarly,
the search in Von Raab was conducted to detect the existence of drug use by Customs
Service employees. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
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which will be presently used to confirm or deny a current suspi-
cion that members of a group are disobeying regulations.
In Jones, however, nothing will be presently proven by the
search performed on the plaintiffs. Unlike the cases in the catego-
ries described in the preceding paragraph, there is no pending
question of current guilt which will be presently solved as a result
of the search. Rather, the Jones search is conducted merely to
obtain identification characteristics projected for use to detect
crimes in the future. Events winch occur in the future are patently
uncertain. And recall the assertion that the arbitrariness of acts
conducted with the objective of answering a question is directly
proportional to the uncertainty of the existence of the question.
Because recidivism and, thus, the question of the searched
individual's guilt is ultimately uncertain, the Jones search is arbi-
trary and intolerable under the Fourth Amendment.
D. Policy Considerations
The Jones case is the most recent step on the path toward an
Orwellian state in which government is given license to freely
transgress the privacy interests of individuals under the auspices of
deterrence and detection of crime. By upholding the Jones search,
the courts authorized the state to conduct highly intrusive searches,
justified only by the state's interest in deterring and detecting
crimes winch may never occur. This is pure, unfettered discretion
ripe for abuse. As a result of Jones, the state can search virtually
any person or place under the pretense of obtaining information to
be used for preventing or detecting future crimes.
Even if the courts choose to limit the Jones justification to the
prevention of high probability crimes,'" significant privacy inter-
130. After Von Raab, it is questionable whether the Court will constrain the scope of
the search at all. Justice Scalia noted in his dissent that the drug testing policy upheld in
Von Raab could not solve any present problems in the Customs Service because the
government failed to provide evidence supporting the assertion that there was disobedience
in the ranks:
The Court's opnon will be searched in vain for real evidence
of a real problem that will be solved by urine testing of Customs Service
employees
What is absent in the Government's justifications - notably absent,
revealingly absent, and as far as I am concerned dispositively absent - is the
recitation of even a single instance in which any of the speculated horribles
actually occurred: an instance, that is, in which the cause of bribetaking, or of
poor an, or of unsympathetic law enforcement, or of compromise of classified
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ests are implicated. For instance, as a result of the Jones holding,
the state could conceivably authorize its police to stop any car
traveling within a ten mile radius of a high crime area to record
the identity and description of the driver and any passengers for
crime prevention and deterrence purposes. This application of Jones
would effectively overrule Terry because no reasonable suspicion of
current wrongdoing would be necessary to detain and search the
individuals. Alternatively, the state might choose to operate roving
patrols in high crime neighborhoods entering residents' homes and
recording the appliances found there. Then, in the future, the pa-
trols could re-enter the homes, compare the initial record with a
current inventory of appliances in the house and require the resi-
dents to justify legitimate acquisitions should additional appliances
be found.
While the statute at issue in Jones confines the search to those
persons the state believes are predisposed to committing a future
crime, there is no legitimate reason for limiting the scope of the
search in such a manner if the state's interest in preventing or
detecting future crimes is sufficiently significant to justify compro-
nuse of Fourth Amendment rights. The state has not developed a
fool-proof method to ascertain the identity of those who will most
certainly commit a crime in the future. Anyone may commit a
crime. Therefore, under the detection and prevention rationale, the
state should arguably be allowed to extend its justification to re-
quire that blood samples be taken from everyone at birth, the DNA
analyzed and identification characteristics recorded. What better
method of detecting or deterring future crimes than to record iden-
tification characteristics of the entire population?
The potential for harassment and other abuses of discretion
resulting from the offspring of Jones is thus evident. The Virginia
Code and others like it cannot be permitted to stand.
MCHAEL W KIER
reformation, was drug use.
National Treasury Employees Umon v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 681, 683 (1989) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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